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ACCESS DENIED: INCARCERATED JUVENILES AND
THEIR RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS
In the current flux of an increasingly punitive juvenile justice system, one of the
system's great injustices receives little attention. Unconstitutional conditions of
confinement for juveniles do not receive appropriate legal exposure. Challenges to
these conditions are more difficult in light of the Supreme Court's recent restriction
of a prisoner's right of access to the courts. This Note will analyze why a different
standard of "meaningful access" is necessary to protect juveniles.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, growing public concern regarding juvenile crime
levels has produced extensive legislative action and a corresponding increase in
judicial activism to "get tough" on juvenile crime.' Juvenile justice reform is taking
top priority at both the state2 and federal levels.' Reforms, however, do not always
See Kirk Loggins, North, East Support LiftedAdams to Win, TENNESSEAN (Nashville),
May 7, 1998, at 8B, available in 1998 WL 11553063 (discussing the election of Davidson
County juvenile court judge Betty Adams and her "get tough" platform); Abraham
McLaughlin, America is Tried and Conflicted Over Youth Crime, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Aug. 16, 1998, at G3, available in 1998 WL 4230027 (stating that "the pendulum has swung
toward tough punishment"); Kathy Sanders, Lawmakers Focus on Preventing Teen Crime,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 2, 1998, at 2, available in 1998 WL 3286455 ("For five
years, Texas lawmakers have focused on a get-tough approach to juvenile crime."); Taft
Outlines Plan to Stop Juvenile Crime, June 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7421374
(discussing the Ohio Republican Gubernatorial candidate's proposed "get-tough-on-juvenile-
crime platform").
2 See ADELIA YEE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE CRIME
AND JUSTICE: STATE LAWS IN 1997, in 23 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT, No. 13, at 3-5 (Apr. 1998) (discussing changes in state law);
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSOCIATION, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES IN THE STATES: 1994-1996 (Program
Report) 79 (Oct. 1997) (referring to the "50 miniature laboratories in which juvenile justice
policy is being tried and tested"); see also PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT
JUVENILE CRIME (Research Report) 59-61 (July 1996). The July 1996 Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention report stated that:
Since 1992, legislative activity has produced revisions to the laws concerning
juvenile crime in more than 90% of the States. A review of the laws regarding
jurisdiction, sentencing, correctional programming, information sharing, and the
role of victims reveals that 47 States and the District of Columbia have made
substantive changes in the past 4 years. In many States, change has occurred in
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equate to improvements and, in fact, can threaten the welfare of juveniles in the
justice system.
Shortly following the hotly debated Prison Litigation Reform Act's legislative
reforms,4 the Supreme Court followed suit and, in effect, created a substantial judicial
reform that set prisoners' rights back several decades. In Lewis v. Casey,' the Court
redefined a prisoner's right of access to the courts, significantly limiting the
commonly accepted definition of "meaningful access" as set forth in Bounds v.
Smith.6 As lower courts struggle to grasp this new definition, incarcerated juveniles
face a significant risk of losing meaningful access to the courts.
Casey's scope of right of access to the courts threatens to undermine John L. v.
Adams,7 an earlier Sixth Circuit decision largely based on Bounds' scope of the right.
In John L., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that failing to provide
incarcerated juveniles with legal assistance is a violation of their right of access to the
courts.8 Juveniles would not be able to secure "meaningful access" to the courts
unless they had legal counsel.' This Note discusses the impact of Lewis v. Casey and
the potential persuasive authority of John L. v. Adams on incarcerated juveniles' right
of access to the courts. Part I analyzes the Sixth Circuit's holding in John L. v.
Adams. Part II examines the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. Casey and its
redefinition of the right of access. Part III discusses the impact of Casey in the
current context of juvenile justice as defined by the movement away from
rehabilitation, the conditions of juvenile confinement, and the general trend of
reducing prisoner litigation. Finally, Part IV details three arguments for the post-
Casey persuasive authority of John L.: first, the Casey decision is not a decisive
precedent for cases involving confined juveniles; second, juveniles should qualify as
a separate category of inmates requiring affirmative assistance; and, third, juveniles
suffer actual injury by not having legal representation.
each of the past four legislative sessions. Moreover, more rapid and sweeping
change has occurred in 1995 and continues to accelerate.
Id. at 59.
' Juvenile justice reform was one of the top ten priority legislative initiatives of the 105th
Congress. See Pete Domenici, Domenici's Juvenile Justice Provisions Introduced in Top-10
Legislative Package, Jan. 21, 1997 (government press release), available in 1997 WL
4428751; see also James Turpin, Juvenile Justice in the Spotlight, CORRECTIONs TODAY,
June 1, 1997, at 124, available in 1997 WL 10514050 (stating that President Clinton, Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott, and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich viewed juvenile
justice as one of the top five priorities for the 105th Congress).
' Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (Supp. III 1997)).
' 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
6 430 U.S. 817, 830 (1977).





I. ANALYSIS OF JOHN L. V. ADAMS
In 1992, incarcerated juveniles in secure Tennessee institutions brought a class
action suit against the Tennessee Department of Youth Development.'I In John L.
v. Adams, juveniles alleged that corrections officials had denied them their
constitutional right of access to the courts." The Sixth Circuit held that juvenile
detainees do have a right of access to the courts, and that this right includes
meaningful access to the services of an attorney.' 2
In finding that juveniles have a right of access to the courts, the Sixth Circuit
denied Tennessee's appeal from the district court's holding thatjuveniles have a right
of access to the courts. 3 As the basis for its appeal, Tennessee argued that because
state law treats adults and juveniles differently, juveniles do not have a right of access
to the courts. 4 The court, however, reasoned that the differences in legal treatment
between incarcerated juveniles and adults are not material, stating that the fact of
incarceration is the "most significant similarity."'5 The court apparently considered
the similarities of incarceration-related legal problems facing both juveniles and
adults to be of greater import than any differences in treatment under Tennessee law
and, consequently, affirmed the district court's ruling that Tennessee must accord
juveniles "'a right of access to the courts comparable to incarcerated adults."" 16
In John L., the court traced a line of other judicial decisions that recognized the
right of access for prisoners as arising out of the Due Process Clause. 7 In Exparte
Hull," the Supreme Court stated that a "state and its officers may not abridge or
impair [a] petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus."'9
The Sixth Circuit also cited the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. Avery2° that
permitted inmates to assist other prisoners in preparing petitions for post-conviction
relief when the state provided no reasonable alternative measures for accessing the
courts.2 1
'0 See id. at 228.
See id. at 230.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id. at231.
'5 Id.
16 Id. (quoting John L. v. Adams, 750 F. Supp. 288, 291 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)).
"7 The Sixth Circuit also noted that the right of access to the courts derives existence from
the Equal Protection Clause. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (holding that
the right of access derives from the Equal Protection Clause).
"S 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
'9 Id. at 549.
20 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
2 See John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson, 393 U.S. at
490).
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In John L., the Sixth Circuit then pointed to Wolff v. McDonnell 22 and the
Supreme Court's extension of the right of access beyond habeas corpus petitions to
civil rights actions.23 The Sixth Circuit quoted Justice White's majority opinion in
Wo/ffto establish that "'[t]he right of access to the courts... is founded in the Due
Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present
to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional
rights."' 24
The Sixth Circuit, however, drew its most extensive analysis of the right of
access to the courts from the Supreme Court's opinion in Bounds v. Smith.25 In
Bounds, the Court stated that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law., 26 Bounds compelled states to
"shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners [adequate, effective, and]
meaningful access to the courts. 27
The Sixth Circuit recognized that most of the cases involving access to courts
dealt with adult prisoners, but that several courts had extended this right to
juveniles.21 In Morgan v. Sproat,29 a conditions of confinement challenge, the
Mississippi court held that juveniles committed to a state "training" school have a
right of access to the courts.30 In Morgan, the district court held that, under a Bounds
analysis, the state must "enable prisoners to place their grievances before the judicial
system."'
In John L., the court also looked to the Supreme Court's general guidelines set
out in In re Gault,32 which is recognized widely as the first and premiere case
establishing children's rights.33 In Gault, the Supreme Court extended the
application of due process standards to juvenile proceedings.34 Justice Fortas
emphasized the importance of due process regardless of age, noting that "[u]nder our
22 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
23 See John L., 969 F.2d at 232.
24 Id. (quoting Woff, 418 U.S. at 579).
25 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
26 Id. at 828.
27 Id. at 824; see also id. at 822.
28 See John L., 969 F.2d at 232-33.
29 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
30 See id. at 1135-36.
31 Id. at 1157.
32 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
33 Gault was a child abuse case, but because courts did not recognize children's rights at
the time, it was tried under a prevention of cruelty to animals statute. Id.
34 See id at 13.
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Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."35 The
Court in Gault, however, also acknowledged that the differences between adults and
juveniles may warrant a different form of due process.36 The Sixth Circuit then
reviewed a line of cases from the First Circuit that recognized ajuvenile's right of
access to the courts 7 In Germany v. Vance,38 an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the First Circuit held that the "plaintiff's status as ajuvenile offers no excuse.
Defendants contend that 'the Constitutional requirements of Bounds have never been
applied to juvenile correctional systems.' We reject any implication that the
constitutional right of access to the courts does not apply to juveniles in [Department
of Youth Services] custody. 39
After determining that juveniles had a right of access to the courts, the Sixth
Circuit looked to Bounds to clarify the scope of the right.' In Bounds, the Court held
that access must be "adequate, effective and meaningful."' In its review, the Sixth
Circuit looked carefully at the third requirement of Bounds and whether the
incarcerated juveniles had "meaningful" access to the courts.42 The court stated the
proposition that "the touchstone of the right of access is meaningfulness. 43
Courts in subsequent cases primarily focused on the scope of the Bounds
"meaningfulness" requirement, until the decision in Lewis v. Casey," involving
prisoners' rights of access to the courts.45 This amorphous standard has allowed the
courts to exercise a great deal of discretion in looking at the facts of each case and
in determining appropriate outcomes on a case by case basis. In Bounds, the Court
set forth minimal guidelines to define "meaningfulness" in its holding that "the
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to
assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law."46
The Sixth Circuit determined that the incarcerated juveniles in John L. did not
have "meaningful" access.47 Although the juveniles had access to a law library, the
3 Id. at 28.
36 See id. at 28-29.
17 See John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 233 (6th Cir. 1992).
38 868 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1989).
31 Id. at 16.
40 John L., 969 F.2d at 233-34.
4' Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977).
42 John L., 969 F.2d at 237.
43 Id.
44 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
41 See souces cited infra note 61.
46 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
41 See John L., 969 F.2d at 234.
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court held that such access is not enough to secure meaningful access for juveniles.48
The court concluded that "in order for ... juvenile plaintiffs to have meaningful
access to the courts, they must be afforded access to an attorney."49 In reaching its
decision, the court noted age, "lack of experience with the criminal system," and
"relatively short confinement" as reasons for requiring assistance from an attorney
for juveniles.50
The court also noted other situations in which courts have found that a library is
insufficient and that incarcerated individuals must have access to counsel. For
example, in Ward v. Kort,51 the Tenth Circuit held that committed mental patients
must be afforded access to counsel. Some courts have held that libraries do not
provide adequately for non-English speaking or illiterate inmates' right of access to
the courts.52 In Hadix v. Johnson, a Michigan District Court held that failure to
provide access to an attorney is a violation of illiterate and segregated prisoners' right
of access to the courts.53 Another court agreed, holding that an inmate's low level of
education is a relevant factor in determining whether access to an attorney is
necessary or whether a law library will protect the right of access to the courts
sufficiently.54
The court in John L. further determined that the right of access extends only to
civil rights claims related to incarceration, under Section 1983, and to constitutional
rights.55 The state need not provide an attorney for the purposes of pursuing general
civil litigation matters or for claims made only under Tennessee law.56 Furthermore,
in Section 1983, the state must reimburse contract attorneys for their assistance
actions only if those actions are related to juveniles' incarceration.57
Thus, the Sixth Circuit did not extend the scope of claims for which incarcerated
juveniles have a right of access to the courts beyond the rights that Bounds afforded
adult inmates. The Court in Bounds stated that habeas corpus and civil rights actions
are of "'fundamental importance ... in our constitutional scheme' because they




" 762 F.2d 856, 860-61 (10th Cir. 1985).
52 See, e.g., Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 n.21 (5th Cir. 1980); Stevenson v. Reed,
391 F. Supp. 1375, 1380-82 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
" See Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F. Supp. 259, 288 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
14 See Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F. Supp. 106, 110 (W.D. Ky. 1983) ("Even if unlimited
physical access could be provided to the law library, it would be unavailing to one who lacks
sufficient opportunity or intellectual ability to utilize the facility.").
" See John L., 969 F.2d at 237.
56 See id.
17 See id
58 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
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sought to protect for juveniles in John L. The Sixth Circuit also recognized, as did
the Supreme Court in Bounds, that in all other civil actions the state cannot "erect
barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated persons."59 This holding
meant that, although states do not have a duty to remove all barriers to the courts,
they cannot create obstacles for incarcerated individuals.
II. ANALYSIS OF LEWIS V. CASEY 60
The Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. Casey represented the rejection of
twenty years ofjurisprudence. Prior to Casey, courts consistently had interpreted
Bounds as imposing an affirmative obligation on the states to ensure a prisoner's
right of access to the courts.6'
Casey involved a claim by prisoners in Arizona Department of Corrections
("ADOC") facilities challenging a policy that prohibited contact visits with their
attorneys. 62 The inmates claimed that this policy violated their due process right of
access to the courts under Section 1983.63
A majority of the Court held that a prohibition on contact visits with an attorney
is not a violation of an inmate's right of access unless the inmate establishes actual
injury.' It is not enough to show that library or legal assistance is subpar.65 Rather,
the inmates must show that the inadequacies of the library or legal assistance actually
hindered the inmates' pursuits of legal claims.66 In support of this holding, the Court
noted that "[c]ourts have no power to presume and remediate harm that has not been
established. 67
In Casey, the Court demonstrated concern that the judiciary must not violate the
doctrine of standing and overreach its bounds." The Supreme Court admonished the
lower court and warned that courts should not perform legislative functions.69 It is
485 (1969)).
59 John L., 969 F.2d at 235.
60 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
61 See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1989); Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d
996, 999 (6th Cir. 1992); Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1989); Cruz v. Hauck,
627 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1980); Canterino v. Wilson, 644 F. Supp. 738, 739 (W.D. Ky.
1986).
62 See Casey, 518 U.S. at 343.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 349.
65 See id. at 347-51.
66 See id at 350.
67 Id. at 361 n.7.
61 See id. at 350.
69 See id. at 363.
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not the judiciary's duty, but rather the legislature's duty, "to shape the institutions of
government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution."7
The Supreme Court maintained that the proper judicial stance was to apply a
deferential standard,7 and quoted Turner v. Safley for the proposition that when "a
prison regulation imping[es] on inmates' constitutional rights," the regulation "'is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' 72 Any standard
of review other than this "reasonably related" standard would interfere with the
ability of the legislature and prison staff to run an effective prison system.73
Specifically, the Court stated that "' [s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison
officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration."' 74
The Court ultimately determined that the Bounds holding did not create an
absolute right to a law library or to legal assistance.75 The critical language in
Bounds stated that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."76 In repudiating this language,
the Court rejected a long line of opinions that interpreted Bounds as requiring a
prison to provide its inmates with a law library, legal counsel, or both.77
Even if Bounds required the affirmative assistance of prison officials in an
inmate's effort to bring a legal claim, the Court held, in Casey, that this requirement
70 Id. at 349.
71 Id. at 361.
72 Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
71 See id; see also Rudolph Alexander, Jr., Hands-Off Hands-On, Hands-Semi-Off" A
Discussion of the Current Legal Test Used by the United States Supreme Court to Decide
Inmates'Rights, 17 J. CRIME & JUST. 103, 104-08 (1994), cited in MARILYN MCSHANE &
FRANK P. WILLIAMS III, THE AMERICAN COURT SYSTEM 41-46 (1997) (discussing the
development of this "semi-hands-off doctrine" which argues that courts should not interfere
with prison management). The Court in Turner v. Safley also noted that "[riunning a prison
is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment
of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government." Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85.
74 Casey, 518 U.S. at 361 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). But see O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution was not
adopted as a means of enhancing the efficiency with which government officials conduct their
affairs, nor as a blueprint for ensuring sufficient reliance on administrative expertise.").
" See Casey, 518 U.S. at 350.
76 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
7 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1989); Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 999
(6th Cir. 1992); Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1989); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d
710, 719 (5th Cir. 1980); Canterino v. Wilson, 644 F. Supp. 738, 739 (W.D. Ky. 1986).
620 [Vol. 7:2
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impermissibly extended the scope of the right of access.7" Courts previously had not
recognized such a broad scope of the right. Prior to Bounds, courts had not
established an affirmative obligation to provide legal assistance.7 9
Moreover, the Court noted that the right of access to courts is not an extensive
right.8" In so doing, it reflected a recent public outcry regarding the influx of prison
litigation: "Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform
themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder
derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims."'" Instead, the Court explained:
The tools [which the right of access to the courts] requires to be provided
are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly
or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their
confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of
the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction
and incarceration.82
Justice Thomas's concurrence paints an even bleaker picture for prisoners' rights
of access.8 3 Thomas discussed the ambiguity of whether a positive constitutional
right of access even exists.' He argued that the "'right of access' to the courts" 5 is
a right "framed exclusively in the negative,"86 by citing the holding in Exparte Hull
that "a State may not 'abridge or impair' a prisoner's ability to file a habeas
petition."" Thomas also cited Johnson v. Avery,8 arguing that a state cannot
'den[y] or obstruc[t]' a prisoner's" attempts to gain access to courts of law.89
Thomas then voiced his significant concern with overstepping the judiciary's
power.' He reasoned that "'[i]t is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State
has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws,
regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons."' 9
78 See Casey, 518 U.S. at 353.
'9 See id. at 354.
'0 See id. at 355.
1 Id.
82 Id.
83 See id. at 364-93 (Thomas, J., concurring).
84 See id. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring).
s Id. at 379 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
86 Id. at 380 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 379 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 312 U.S. at 549).
88 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
89 Casey, 518 U.S. at 380 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485).
90 See id. at 386 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9' Id (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92
(1973)).
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Another major concern for Justice Thomas was that the courts were requiring the
state to pay for legal assistance to inmates.92 According to Thomas's reasoning, the
state does not have an obligation to pay for the non-incarcerated population's legal
services and, therefore, has no obligation to provide these services to the incarcerated
population:
Like anyone else seeking to bring suit without the assistance of the
State, prisoners can seek the advice of an attorney, whether pro bono or
paid, and can turn to family, friends, other inmates, or public interest
groups. Inmates can also take advantage of the liberal pleading rules for
pro se litigants and the liberal rules governing appointment of counsel.
Federal fee-shifting statutes and the promise of a contingency fee should
also provide sufficient incentive for counsel to take meritorious cases.93
The Casey decision greatly reduced the likelihood of a successful claim for
violation of an individual's right of access to the courts. The majority of
challenges-if not all challenges-brought after Casey have failed to show the
requisite injury as a result of alleged inadequate legal assistance.94 Even if the
inmates can show an inadequate system, it is difficult to prove a resultant harm. To
do so, inmates would have to prove that, if it were not for the inadequacies of the
system, they would have had a winning case. Not only do they essentially have to
92 See id. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring).
" Id. at 375 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring).
94 See Dahler v. Goodman, No. 97-3177, 1998 WL 67359, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 1998)
("As Lewis made clear, a prisoner may bring a claim alleging an infringement of his
constitutional right of access to the courts based on alleged inadequacies in his prison's legal
assistance program if, and only if, the prisoner can demonstrate that these inadequacies have
caused him 'actual injury."'); Ryder v. Van Ochten, No. 96-2043, 1997 WL 720482, at *2
(6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997) ("Lewis also made clear that denial of an adequate law library or
adequate assistance is not actionable unless the inmate can show that he suffered actual injury
as a result of the inadequacy." (citing Casey, 518 U.S. at 351)); Beaven v. Debruyn, No. 96-
3265, 1997 WL 599640, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 25, 1997) ("In order to state a claim for the
violation of the constitutional right of access to the courts, an inmate must allege, not only
a failure by prison officials to provide a constitutionally adequate legal assistance
program.., but also an 'actual injury' resulting from the inadequate program."); Klinger v.
Department of Corrections, 107 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e hold that plaintiffs'
access-to-courts claim fails as a matter of law under Lewis v. Casey .... [A]ctual injury must
be proven in order to prevail on an access-to-courts claim."); Weems v. Vose, No. 95-2235,
1996 WL 390465, at *1 (1st Cir. July 12, 1996) (finding that inmate failed to prove "actual
injury" as required by Casey); Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996)
("[A]n inmate must satisfy the standing requirement of 'actual injury' by showing that the
denial of legal resources hindered the prisoner's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim.").
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prove their case, but they also must show that they have suffered some resultant
harm.
III. IMPACT OF CASEY IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Although no one has litigated the issue, it is likely that the holding in Casey will
similarly reduce the state's affirmative obligations in protecting juveniles' right of
access. Contrary to the opinion in John L., the assistance of counsel probably no
longer will be required. Casey discourages solutions such as those that the Sixth
Circuit presented in John L. The holding in Casey substantially undercut any
persuasive value that John L. might have had. States no longer have this incentive
to hire attorneys or to place them in juvenile facilities.
While, at first glance, this undermining of John L. may not seem tobe of great
import, it is alarming when considered in conjunction with several current juvenile
justice trends and issues. First, the juvenile justice system is becoming more punitive
in nature. Second, unconstitutional conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities
persist. Third, legislation has made it more difficult for incarcerated individuals to
litigate.
Some might argue that juveniles do not deserve any special protections-that
juvenile offenders should be treated similarly to adult offenders. Yet what juveniles
are facing is not simply the withdrawal of a protective shield, but also the subjection
to unconstitutional conditions of confinement without any effective defenses.
A. Juvenile Justice: Moving Away from Rehabilitation
Federal and state legislatures have turned to increasingly punitive measures to
combat juvenile crime. Despite the fact that most juvenile offenders are status
offenders or commit nonviolent crimes,95 the nation increasingly bases its juvenile
policy decisions on the perception of these youth as "'parasitic,' 'animalistic,'
'depraved,' 'super predators.' '' 9 Longer periods of incarceration, increased ease of
transferring a juvenile to adult court, and more punitive sanctions are part of a
nationwide trend to "get tough" on juvenile crime.97
95 See Juvenile Justice Awry, AMERICA, Nov. 21, 1998, at 3 (stating that nonviolent
offenses account for 94% of juvenile arrests).
96 Charles J. Aron & Michele S. C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice at the Crossroads, 22
CHAMPION 10, 10 (June 1998).
91 See Co. REV. STAT. §§ 19-2-516 to -518 (1998) (lowering the age ofjuveniles eligible
for transfer to district court jurisdiction); Co. REV. STAT. §§ 19-2-107(l), 19-2-601(3)(a)
(eliminating the right to a jury trial in most cases); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 635.060(4)-(5)
(Banks-Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1996) (increasing the potential incarceration period in a
juvenile detention center from 30 to 90 days for children 16 years or older who commit
public offenses); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 635.020(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1996)
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Recent federal legislative action has called the rehabilitative purpose ofjuvenile
detention into question. For example, Senator Ashcrofl, of Missouri, commented in
a recent Senate Committee Hearing on the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act
of 1997:9s
Today we are living with a juvenile justice system that was created around
the time of the silent film. We are living with a juvenile justice system
that reprimands the crime victim for being at the wrong place at the wrong
time, and then turns around and hugs the juvenile terrorist, whispering
ever so softly into his ear, "Don't worry, the State will cure you. 99
The Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act reflects the growing belief that "the
rehabilitative model of sentencing for juveniles... is inadequate and inappropriate
for dealing with violent and repeat juvenile offenders."'"
State governments have been just as active, if not more so, in "reforming"
juvenile justice.' ' For example, in the 1994-1995 state legislative session alone,
states introduced over 700 juvenile justice reform bills. 2 States are punishing
juvenile offenders as adults, increasing the potential length ofjuvenile incarceration,
and allowing for the transfer ofjuveniles to the adult system at a younger age.,0 3
This movement towards more punitive treatment ofjuveniles portends a future
horror that this country's juvenile justice history foreshadows. The nation is
(allowing for the transfer to adult court of a juvenile who is at least 16, who is accused of a
felony, and who has a prior felony adjudication); see also Kim Brooks et al., Beyond In re
Gault: The Status of Juvenile Defense in Kentucky, 5 KY. CHILDREN'S RTS. J. 1 (1997)
(discussing modifications in Kentucky's juvenile justice system); James E. Craig, Family
Law Newsletter: Highlights of Colorado's New Juvenile Justice Provisions, 26 COLO. LAW.
63 (1997) (discussing modifications to Colorado's juvenile justice code provisions).
9 Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, S. 10, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(6)
(1997).
99 143 CONG. REC. S145-01, at 145 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
100 Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, S, 10, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(6)
(1997).
'0' See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSOCIATION, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States 1994-1996
(Program Report) 79 (Oct. 1997); Robert B. Acton, Note, Gubernatorial Initiatives and
Rhetoric of Juvenile Justice Reform, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 277, 281 n.21 (1996) (discussing the
movements of numerous states-Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Virginia-toward a more punitive juvenile justice system); Fox Butterfield, States
Revamping Laws on Juveniles as Felonies Soar, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, at 1.
'02 See Barry Krisberg, The Legacy of Juvenile Corrections,CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug.
1, 1995, at 122, available in 1995 WL 15012604.
"03 See supra notes 2, 95-97 and accompanying text.
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reversing course, paying little heed to the devastating lesson that history already
taught it. The first juvenile detention centers in the United States opened in 1899,
in response to atrocities that juveniles suffered in adult prisons.' A Justice Policy
Institute ("JPI") report stated:
Close to a century ago ... the juvenile justice system was developed
because children were subjected to unspeakable atrocities in adult jails,
and were returned to society as hardened criminals. As the system
developed, it became clear that housing young offenders and adult
prisoners together was self-destructive and self-defeating.' 5
The creation ofjuvenile detention centers, however, did not resolve the problem
of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. In the 1970s, juveniles in Arkansas
facilities suffered such inhumane treatment as: being made to kill a dog as discipline;
being forced to wear a dog's tail; being chained to a bed as punishment; being forced
to eat feces and vomit; and being made to get on their hands and knees and oink like,
pigs."°' When confronted with these troubling occurrences in the system, Arkansas
officials responded that "the program was good and should be continued."' 17 In
another instance, a juvenile detention facility forced some of its youths to clean up
after a suicide.'08
Such brutal forms of punishment resulted in the stunned disbelief of many
commentators. One noted that "[i]t is hard to believe that in the late twentieth
century the American people would sanction such brutal treatment of children.
Perhaps the human race is not far removed from those animals that attack their
young."'' 9 Another commented that "[d]etention centers are nothing more than
'o See Joseph T. Christy, Toward a Model Secure Detention Program: Lessons from
Shuman Center, in REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION: No MORE HIDDEN CLOSETS 108, 110
(Ira M. Schwartz & William H. Barton eds., 1994) [hereinafter REFORMING JUVENILE
DETENTION] (citing T. Stokes & S. Smith, Juvenile Detention: A Nationally Recognized
Definition, J. FOR JUV. JUST. & DETENTION SERV. 24-26 (1990)). State reform schools and
juvenile facilities run by religious philanthropic organizations opened as early as 1825. See
Krisberg, supra note 102, at 122.
"' Alex Adwan, Juveniles Behind Bars, TULSA WORLD, July 20, 1997, at G 1, available
in 1997 WL 3643872 (quoting JASON ZIEDENBERG & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, JUVENILE POLICY
INSTITUTE STUDY).
'06 See KENNETH WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S
INCARCERATED CHILDREN 113-16 (1976).
107 Id. at 115.
'o' See IRA M. SCHWARTZ, INJUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 13 (1989). Schwartz identifies other
frightening conditions of confinement. See id. at 11-15.
109 DONALD B. KING, 100 INJUSTICES TO THE CHILD 92 (1971) (quoting HOWARD JAMES,
CHILDREN IN TROUBLE: A NATIONAL SCANDAL 106 (1970)).
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factories of dehumanization and brutalization and from which the children are
shipped out to larger institutions with longer histories of the sameprocesses. '
Approximately thirty years ago in Kent v. United States,' the Supreme Court
addressed such inequities in the juvenile justice system, noting that juveniles are not
granted the same rights as adults and yet are not accorded beneficial treatment as a
function of their age." 2 The Court stated that "[t]here is evidence, in fact, that there
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.""' 3
Kent v. United States signaled the juvenile justice system's change in focus from
punitive to rehabilitative goals. Shortly after the ruling in Kent, Congress passed the
1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA")." 4 The JJDPA
explicitly focused on the individualized rehabilitative treatment, rather than punitive
treatment, of juvenile offenders." 5 The legislation provided states with juvenile
justice grants if they separated juvenile and adult offenders and promoted other
"advanced juvenile justice practices."'" 6 Rehabilitation, despite differing opinions
on whether the JJDPA successfully implemented it,"7 was widely-recognized as the
primary goal ofjuvenile detention."' The National Juvenile Detention Association,
as recently as 1990, defined juvenile detention as:
the temporary and safe custody of juveniles who are accused of conduct
subject to the jurisdiction of the court and require a restricted environment
for their own community's safety while pending legal action ....
110 WOODEN, supra note 106, at 98.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
12 See id. at 555-56.
113 Id. at 556.
"4 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 96, at 12.
" See id. The JJDPA modeled its provisions on Massachusetts' reforms to its juvenile
justice system and the movement towards the use of smaller facilities and community-based
programs. See Krisberg, supra note 102, at 122.
116 Krisberg, supra note 102, at 122.
1 7 See id. (indicating that the Reagan and Bush administrations did not support the JJDPA
rehabilitative reforms and that the movement toward more punitive treatment of juveniles
started in the 1980s); "The Juvenile Crime Control and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1997" Draft Legislation Before the Subcomm. On Early Childhood, Youth and Families of
the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of
Michael Petit, Deputy Director, Child Welfare League of America) (discussing JJDPA's
positive rehabilitative impact over the last two decades).
..8 See Holly Beatty, Comment, Is the Trend to Expand Juvenile Transfer Statutes Just
an Easy Answer to a Complex Problem?, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 979, 980-83 (1995) (discussing
the traditional rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system).
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Further, juvenile detention provides a wide range of helpful services
that support the juvenile's physical, emotional, and social development.
Helpful services minimally include: education, recreation, counseling,
nutrition, medical and health care services, reading, visitation,
communication, and continuous supervision." 9
If history is any indication, the movement back to a more punitive juvenile justice
system will result in more severe conditions of confinement.
B. Conditions of Confinement
Although the trend toward a more punitive juvenile justice system likely will
increase the severity and/or number of incidences of unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, it is important to remember that juveniles are currently suffering
unconstitutional conditions of'confinement. 2 ' Circuit Judge Tom Peterson of Dade
County, Florida stated: "This is the year for locking kids up, so it's hard to get people
worked up... [b]ut I've been in this business for 30 years and never seen anything
like it."' 2 As Virginia officials recently noted, "get tough" legislation has aggravated
overcrowding and conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities. 22 In a recent
study, juvenile detention centers largely failed to meet all six basic health service
criteria. 2 3 Overcrowding and failure to provide educational services are just two
"9 Christy, supra note 104, at 108, 110 (citing Stokes & Smith, supra note 104, at 24-26).
,20 See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
121 Sarah Huntley, Teens Doing Hard Time in Prison Outrages Judge, TAMPA TRIB., Oct.
3, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 13835816 (discussing poor conditions of confinement
and treatment of juveniles at the Pahokee Youth Development Center such as forcing
juveniles to stand, stripped to their underwear, in solitary confinement); see also Kenton's
Dungeon, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), July 31,1996, at 6A, available in 1996 WL 6356476
(stating that "[a]nyone who believes that state-sanctioned abuse of juveniles went out with
the 19th Century should read U. S. District Judge William 0. Bertelsman's account of how
young people are treated at the Kenton County jail. It sounds like it came from a Charles
Dickens novel.").
"' See Frank Green, Efforts in Prisons Defended, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 17,
1996, at BI, available in 1996 WL 2290939.
123 See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OF.FENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 152,
173 (Aug. 1995). Less than half of the juvenile facilities met the stated criteria.
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other concerns that juvenile facilities have failed to address.'24 One author even has
termed the incarceration ofjuveniles "legalized child abuse."'25
Overcrowding presents the most prevalent, and probably most widely-
recognized, impact on confinement conditions.'26 A 1993 study found that more than
seventy-five percent of the confined juvenile population resided in overcrowded
facilities.'27 In 1991, thirty percent of the juveniles slept in under-sized rooms.'28 In
1996, the Washington Post and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") cited
Maryland juvenile detention centers for operating at forty percent above the capacity
they could house "safely."' 29 ACLU legislative counsel Mark Kappelhoff stated that
"[s]ending children to overcrowded and dilapidated detention facilities with limited
education, counseling or treatment programs is not only a blueprint for
catastrophe.., but it promises to produce numerous children who are entirely ill
prepared to face the many challenges confronting them when they are returned back
to society."' 3
Overcrowding also can indicate other problematic conditions of confinement
such as more incidents of institutional violence, suicidal behavior, and increased use
of short-term isolation.' As one author has noted, overcrowded conditions can
result in additional problems in the facilities: "Overcrowded facilities, particularly
facilities in jurisdictions with dwindling fiscal resources, will inevitably lead to
deteriorating conditions of confinement, unprofessional practices, media exposds, and
124 See id at 149, 170; Kellie Patrick, County Gives Low Grade to Youth Center, Classes
Don't Meet Needs, Review Says, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 23, 1999, at 3B
(discussing lack of proper education for juveniles in the Pahokee Youth Development
Center); Frank Green, Beaumont Teaching Alleged to Be Lacking, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, July 10, 1996, at AI (discussing probe into lack of education for some detained
juveniles in Virginia).
125 WOODEN, supra note 106, at 106.
126 See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 123, at 149.
27 See BARBARA ALLEN-HAGEN, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES (Fact Sheet No. 1) (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/ccdet.
txt>; cf SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 123, at 149 (stating that in 1991, 74% of
juveniles resided in crowded detention centers); Ira M. Schwartz & Deborah A. Willis,
National Trends in Juvenile Detention, in REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 104,
at 13, 16 ("In 1979, 6.4% of public detention centers in the United States were over capacity,
housing 8.8% of all youth incarcerated in detention centers. By 1989, 27.5% of the facilities
were over capacity, housing 50.4% of all incarcerated youth.").
2. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 123, at 149.
29 See ACLU News Wire, MD Youth Detention System Strained Beyond Capacity (last
modified Sept. 6, 1996) <http://www.aclu.org/news/w090696b.html>.
130 Id
131 See ALLEN-HAGEN, supra note 127.
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possible exposure to litigation."' Overcrowding presents a security threat and
diminishes quality control.'
Juvenile institutions' reliance on solitary confinement as a punitive measure,
especially if used frequently or for long periods of time, can be unconstitutional. One
author noted that "[c]onditions of solitary confinement have sometimes been
considered as cruel and unusual punishment; the psychological factor of keeping a
child in solitary confinement is most severe."' A recent study by the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention ("OJJDP"), however, found that
facilities housing fifteen percent of the incarcerated juveniles had no time limits on
isolation.' A separate study found that in a one year period, more than 435,800
juveniles were held in short-term isolation, for anywhere between one and twenty-
four hours. 6 The finding of this study also indicated that during the same time
period, almost 84,000 juveniles were put in isolation for longer than twenty-four
hours. 37
For a number ofjuveniles, suicide is the only way out. Over the course of one
year, 11,000 incarcerated juveniles committed 17,600 acts of suicidal behavior. 38
In 1990 alone, ten incarcerated juveniles actually committed suicide.' 39 A sixteen
year-old female who committed suicide while in an Illinois institution wrote the
following poem expressing the isolation she suffered:
There is a crack in the Earth
And I'll have fallen in.
Down in the darkness where I have never been.
People are looking, staring at me;
I lie here and wonder what do they see?
Shall I be here forever
I can not climb back
132 Ira M. Schwartz & Deborah A. Willis, National Trends in Juvenile Detention, in
REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 104, at 13, 20.
131 See Teri K. Martin, Determinants of Juvenile Detention Rates, in REFORMING
JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 104, at 30 ("Overcrowding ofjuvenile detention facilities
threatens the security of residents and staff and undermines the quality of care which can be
provided.").
134 KING, supra note 109, at 92.
... See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 123, at 151.
136 See ALLEN-HAGEN, supra note 127.
137 See id
138 See id; see also Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The
Betrayal of Childhood in the United States, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 177, 198 (1996) (stating that
"each year 11,500 out of 65,000 incarcerated children commit suicidal acts" (citing
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 12, 131 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996)).
3 See ALLEN-HAGEN, supra note 127.
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Rotting and dying in this horrible crack
Am I alive or am I dead.
Oh God, who will save me from
This crack in my head? 4"
The increasing transfer ofjuveniles into adult facilities also is reason for concern.
Studies have shown that children in adult facilities are five times more likely to be
sexually assaulted, two times more likely to suffer physical abuse at the hands of
prison staff, and fifty percent more likely to be attacked with a weapon than children
in juvenile facilities.' Representative William Delahunt of Massachusetts,
discussing the dangers of incarcerating juveniles with adults, stated that an adult
prison is "a graduate school of crime for children."'4
Conditions of confinement challenges, although rare for juveniles, tell the story
of a system in need of reform.'43 In 1993, United States District Court Judge Richard
M. Bilby issued a consent decree mandating 109 changes in Arizona's juvenile
140 WOODEN, supra note 106, at 149.
141 See American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Factsheet on the Juvenile Justice System
(visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/library/fctsht.html> (citing Jeffrey Fagan et al.,
Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-
Custody Dichotomy, 40 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1989); see also Adwan, supra note 105, at GI
(discussing the findings of a Justice Policy Institute study stating "that the youngest inmates
in adult prisons are the 'prototype' of a prison rape victim").
14' Associated Press, Officials at Odds Over Fate of Young Offenders, TULSA WORLD,
June 10, 1997, at A7, available in 1997 WL 3640621.
143 In addition to the cases discussed in this Note, the American Bar Association Juvenile
Justice Center web site offers synopses of conditions of confinement for incarcerated
juveniles. See ABA Criminal Justice Section Juvenile Justice Center, Juvenile State Round-
Up: 1/6/98 (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/1698ru.html>
(discussing a federal court jury's award of $8,000 to a teenager incarcerated in Arkansas'
Washington County jail who "had been beaten, raped and sodomized, had salt rubbed in
wounds, orange peelings rubbed in his eyes, and was forced to lick blood off other inmates
over a period of five days"); ABA Criminal Justice Section Juvenile Justice Center, Juvenile
State Round-Up: 11/10/97 (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
juvjus/1l-10state.html> (discussing a California grand jury decision declaring San
Francisco's Juvenile Hall "unfit to house the city's children" because the institution did not
have water sprinklers or a central locking system); ABA Criminal Justice Section Juvenile
Justice Center, Juvenile State Round-Up: 7/30/97 (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.
abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/7-30state.html> (noting Kentucky's "inadequate and even abusive
care of committed juveniles" and discussing a U.S. District Court Judge's finding that
conditions and overcrowding in South Carolina's juvenile prisons were unconstitutional). In
addition, the Human Rights Watch web site occasionally includes information on conditions
of confinement. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Conditions of Confinement for Children in
Colorado Fail to Meet International Standards (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.hrw.org/
hrw/press/colorado.htm> (discussing human rights abuses in the Colorado juvenile system).
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detention program.'" Those who think that incarcerated juveniles receive "Club
Med" treatment are not entirely incorrect. "Club Med" was the term for an incident
in an Orlando juvenile detention center where guards locked several young boys in
a room with four larger boys and they were "beaten with towels, forced to do
exercises and punched."' 45
These are not isolated examples of abuse. In February 1998, the Justice
Department called for Georgia to reform its juvenile prison system, accusing the state
of "'egregious,' 'abusive' and 'grossly substandard' conditions"'' 6 including:
physically abusing juveniles, stripping juveniles and leaving them locked naked in
their cells for days, using chemical and mechanical restraints on mentally ill
juveniles, and failing to provide them with adequate education, medical, mental
health, and rehabilitative services.'47
In South Carolina, U.S. District Court Judge Joseph Anderson ruled that
overcrowded prisons violated juvenile inmates' constitutional rights.'48 The
December 1990 class action lawsuit had alleged "[s]evere overcrowding, spoiled
food, use of tear gas to maintain discipline and an understaffed infirmary."' 4 9 Despite
the order to improve conditions, 5 ' juveniles reported in 1996 affidavits that "they
were hog tied for hours at a time.., with their wrists handcuffed behind their backs
and tied to their feet .... Others said up to 20 youths were crammed for up to a day
into a cell designed for four, without access to a bathroom. '' 5
Juveniles in the Louisianajuvenile corrections systems spoke of guards who beat
them with broomsticks, sexually abused them, and punched them until they bled.'52
'" See A Quick Guide to the History of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections
(visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.juvenile.state.az.us/html>. The consent decree resulted
from a 1986 civil rights lawsuit that Mathew Davey Johnson, an incarcerated juvenile held
in the Catalina Mountain secure facility, brought against the Catalina Mountain
superintendent James Upchurch and the state of Arizona. See id.
" Debbie Salamone, 2 Ex-Guards at Juvenile Home Avoid Prison Time, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 14, 1997, at DI, available in 1997 WL 2761830.
146 New York Times News Service, Ga. Vows to Improve Its Juvenile Prisons, BALTIMORE
SUN, Mar. 22, 1998, at 10A, available in 1998 WL 4957517.
147 See Reform Deal to Aid Georgia's Juvenile Inmates, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 22, 1998,
at A7, available in 1998 WL 5181422; Steve Visser & Peter Mantius, US., Ga. Reach Pact
on Youth Jails, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 18, 1998, at Fl, available in 1998 WL 3683027 (also
stating that 75% of these juveniles were detained for nonviolent or status offenses).
148 Douglas Davisson, Charges of Mistreatment Resurface at Juvenile Prison, THE
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Dec. 5, 1996, at 6A, available in 1996 WL 8280053.
1'9 Douglas Davisson, DJJ Opens Center to Evaluate Juveniles, THE HERALD (Rock Hill,
S.C.), July 30, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 8123190.
150 See Davisson, supra note 148, at 6A.
151 Id
'52 See James Varney, Youngsters Brutalized Despite Reform Efforts, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 1, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 12658262.
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These abuses continued despite similar findings in a 1996 Justice Department Report
on Louisiana juveniles facilities and subsequent state reform efforts.'53 The 1996
report found that "' [I]iterally dozens of juveniles are being seriously injured on a
monthly basis across the four facilities .... The incidence of fractures to jaws, noses,
cheeks, and eye sockets, as well as serious lacerations requiring sutures (usually to
faces) is disturbing.""9154
C. Trend of Cutting Back on Prisoner Litigation
Not only are conditions of confinement bad and likely to get worse, but the
government also has made it increasingly difficult for incarcerated individuals to
bring lawsuits challenging these conditions. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA") presents the most significant of these obstacles.'
Although the aim of the PLRA is to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits, it
simultaneously fashions more hoops through which the legitimate plaintiff must
jump.'56 John Boston, the director of the Prisoners' Rights Project of the New York
City Legal Aid Society, noted some of the dangerous effects of the PLRA in a recent
editorial:
[Its] provisions deny outright any legal remedy for serious violations of
the law. One prohibits cases "for mental or emotional injury" to inmates
"without a prior showing of physical injury." If upheld, and interpreted
as government lawyers have been urging, this provision will bar any
remedy for constitutional violations that do not leave marks: denial of
mental health care (unless the inmate commits suicide or self-mutilates),
racial discrimination, denial of religious freedom, retaliation for filing
grievances and many others.'
The PLRA also limits the ability of courts to grant prospective relief and to issue
consent decrees.' The PLRA allows for the termination of a consent decree unless
it meets certain specific requirements.'59 When Congress was considering the PLRA,
Senator Joseph Biden, of Delaware, pointed out the devastating effects that it could
153 See id.
'14 Id. (quoting JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT (June 1996)).
15s See Russ Pulliam, An Alternative to Overcrowding, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 5, 1998,
at A8 (stating that a sheriff's decision to double-bunk inmates likely would not be overruled
because of the PLRA).
156 See id.
'57 John Boston, PLRA Is Not the Answer, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 1, 1998, at 21.
5 See id; David C. Leven, 25 Years After Attica, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1996, at 2.
' See Ira Bloom, Prisons, Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall
Separating Legislative from Judicial Power, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 411 (1998).
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have on children. He noted that staff members of a Pennsylvania juvenile detention
facility (at 160 percent holding capacity) often beat the children with chains and other
objects."6 Only the entry of a court order resolved these problems.16' Mark Soler,
president of the Youth Law Center, a national public interest law firm, later testified
that legislators failed to consider the impact of the PLRA on children.'62 He
emphasized the importance of consent decrees in previous jail and juvenile facility
cases; these decrees were now in danger of being terminated since none of them
contained the required PLRA findings.16
3
Prison litigation, although often seen as largely frivolous,'64 has played an
important role in asserting and guaranteeing the rights of the prison population. One
commentator correctly summarized the importance of prison litigation: "Perhaps
more than any other single mechanism, prisoner litigation has contributed to prison
reform, and even when a suit is lost, litigation opens the windows of prisons just a
bit wider to make their historically dark interiors just a bit more visible to those on
the outside."' 65 Conditions of confinement challenges are particularly important, and
result in substantial improvements to the adult system.
As important as this litigation historically has been, and continues to be, for adult
inmates, the defense of incarcerated juveniles' rights takes on added importance. 166
As one juvenile expert noted "children are often unable to defend themselves or
assert their rights in any meaningful way."'
167
A lawyer plays an integral role in the litigation process for incarcerated juveniles.
Unlike adult inmates who have the ability to bring "pro se" litigation, juveniles as a
class lack the proper standing and requisite skill. In general, the "[a]ssistance of a
legal counsel facilitates a more efficient and skillful handling of their complaints and
assures inmates of fair treatment and 'protection of our most valued rights."" 168
160 See 141 CONG. REC. S14,628 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden).
161 See id
162 See Implementation of Prisoners Rights Legislation: Testimony of Mark I. Soler
Hearings on Pub. L. No. 104-134 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 104th Cong. 58 (Sept. 25, 1996), available in 1996 WL 556530.
163 See id.
64 See Sandra J. Senn, Stemming of the Tide: Reduction in Federal Pro Se Prisoner
Lawsuits, 9 S.C. LAW. 24,25 (1997) ("What began in the 1960s with a liberal stance by the
judiciary on the issue of prisoners' rights has now blossomed into an expensive playpen for
convicts and detainees.").
165 JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER 5
(1988).
166 See KING, supra note 109, at 90.
167 Id. at 91.
16 Song Hill, Casey v. Lewis: The Legal Burden is Raised The Physical Barrier is
Spared, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 29 (1995) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
827, 831 (1977) (citation omitted)).
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Alone,juveniles do not have the background necessary to investigate and bring their
own claims.69
By scaling back an inmate's ability to bring a legal claim, governmental power
increases. As one of the amicus briefs for the petitioners in Casey stated, "without
some access to the courts, then there is no possible limit on governmental power."'1
70
Without access to courts, inmates have no method to enforce their other legal
rights. '
The "politics of secrecy"'7 2 in the institutional setting demands that juveniles
have access to legal counsel in order to protect their rights.'7 1 "This deliberate
'politics of secrecy' . . .keeps the American public ignorant of what is happening to
their 100,000 children imprisoned at this very moment."'' 74 Patricia Wald has
described juvenile detention as the "'hidden closet for the skeletons of the rest of the
system."" 75 This secrecy can result in public ignorance regarding confinement
conditions especially when prison staff utilize the "CYA" or "Cover Your Ass"
policy to explain the use of physical punishment to outsiders. 76 Scholars Ira M.
169 See infra notes 196-221 and accompanying text.
170 Transcript of Oral Argument at *38, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (No. 94-
1511), available in 1995 WL 712349.
171 See Julie B. Nobel, Note, Ensuring Meaningful Jailhouse Legal Assistance: The Need
for a Jailhouse Lawyer-Inmate Privilege, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1594 (1997).
172 Senator Bayh noted:
Almost as a rule, confinement institutions are closed systems inaccessible to
public inspection, inaccessible even to judicial review.
... The young inmates are often treated as if they were slaves, while the guards,
too often, become unchallenged tyrants, who can send children to the "hole" on
mere whim or fancied slight. The guard's word is law, not to be challenged or
questioned.
Juvenile Confinement Institutions and Correctional Systems: Hearings on S. 32 Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 92nd Cong. 3 (1971) (statement of Sen.
Birch Bayh, chairman of the subcommittee).
' See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
Prisoners are persons whom most of us would rather not think about.... [T]hey
exist in a shadow world that only dimly enters our awareness.
... When prisoners emerge from the shadows to press a constitutional claim,
they invoke no alien set of principles drawn from a distant culture. Rather, they
speak the language of the charter upon which all of us rely to hold official power
accountable. They ask us to acknowledge that power exercised in the shadows
must be restrained at least as diligently as power that acts in the sunlight.
Id
174 WOODEN, supra note 106, at 21.
"' William H. Barton & Ira M. Schwartz, Introduction, in REFORMING JUVENILE
DETENTION, supra note 104, at 1, 1 (quoting I. M. Schwartz et al., Juvenile Detention: The
Hidden Closet Revisited, 4 Q. JUST. 219-35 (1987)).
176 See WOODEN, supra note 106, at 115.
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Schwartz and Deborah A. Willis maintain that "[b]ecause detention centers are
hidden from view, the problems which confronted the system 20 years ago remain
unaddressed and appear to be spiraling out of control." '77
The increasing trend toward privatization of detention centers calls for even
greater concern regarding the accountability of prison officials.'78 The focus quickly
shifts from traditional goals to profit margins and the 3.2 billion dollar annual
juvenile justice "market.' ' 179 Opponents of privatization have argued that the goals
of incarceration and detention cannot be met simultaneously with a profit motive:
"the most humanistic concepts can be corrupted by those who are relied upon to
actualize them when the lure of financial gain relegates the welfare of the children
to secondary importance.' 80
Inhumane treatment in juvenile facilities more likely will go undetected if
juveniles are not provided with an opportunity to voice their complaints to an
attorney. Not providing juveniles with the assistance of legal counsel only continues
a detrimental trend denying them appropriate representation. Juveniles usually do
not receive legal counsel and assistance until the adjudicatory phase, if then. The
lack of representation can be astonishing-in three surveyed states, less than fifty
percent ofjuveniles charged with delinquency received legal representation. 8' Thus,
they enter the juvenile detention centers without having received any legal
assistance."'
The snapshot of juvenile lawsuits gets lost in the bigger picture of frivolous
prison litigation. Although only one percent of prisoner petitions are successful,
18 3
juveniles rarely file frivolous lawsuits-they understand less about their
constitutional rights and, as Mark Soler noted from his experience, "are reluctant to
177 Ira M. Schwartz & Deborah A. Willis, National Trends in Juvenile Justice, in
REFORMING JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 104, at 13, 21.
178 Several recent reports on poor conditions of confinement have involved privately run
juvenile institutions. See, e.g., Heather Szerlag, Searching for the Bottom Line: Teen Girl's
Death Probed at YSI Iowa Center, YOUTH TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 48.
179 Id.
180 WOODEN, supra note 106, at 231.
181 See DOUGLAS C. DODGE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE DELINQUENCY AND
PREVENTION, DUE PROCESS ADVOCACY (Fact Sheet No. 49) (Jan. 1997) (explaining that this
lack of representation can be attributed to "parents' reluctance to retain an attorney;
inadequate public defender legal services in nonurban areas; and judicial ambivalence toward
advocacy in treatment-oriented juvenile courts").
182 See Sharon McCully, Detention Reform from a Judge's Viewpoint, in REFORMING
JUVENILE DETENTION, supra note 104, at 162, 165. An additional concern is the number of
juveniles who waive the right to counsel in delinquency proceedings. See DODGE, supra note
181 (noting that 34% of the public defender offices surveyed reported that "juveniles 'often'
waive" their right to counsel).
183 See Transcript of Oral Argument at *47, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (No. 94-
1511), available in 1995 WL 712349.
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take action, fearing retribution by staff or thinking that they 'deserve' the treatment
they got."'' Furthermore, providing juvenile inmates with legal assistance actually*
could reduce frivolous claims. According to the oral argument of Ms. Alexander,
attorney for Fletcher Casey in Lewis v. Casey, "the studies of effective legal access
program[s] show that the effect of the program[s] is to reduce the filing of frivolous
lawsuits. The volume goes down, because once prisoners have some opportunity to
know what [the requirements are]."' 5 Juveniles need access to an attorney in order
to determine both their constitutional rights and whether filing a claim would be
frivolous.
Lack of attorney assistance deniesjuveniles meaningful access to the courts and,
therefore, denies them an avenue to address valid complaints. Irreparable harm can
result to the child who has no outlet to vent their complaints or frustrations. The
increasing emphasis on punishment, rather than on rehabilitation, fails to recognize
that the majority of these children will be returned to society. If a fifteen-year-old
child is sentenced to twenty-five years of poor treatment, then society cannot expect
them to behave in conformance with societal norms upon their release. One
counselor, and former inmate, noted:
Our prisons and reformatories are still places where we house the most
wretched members of our society, and expect them to be magically
transformed into acceptable citizens.
That the frogs we wish to become kings usually remain frogs should
come as no surprise to us. Legend has it that in order for a frog to become
a king, the frog must be kissed by a princess. We don't kiss our frogs, we
crush them and we wonder that we have created only crippled frogs
instead of kings.'86
As the National Juvenile Defender Association recognized in their mission
statement, "[b]ecause juveniles are immature and still developing, the impact of
environment is forceful. No environment is neutral; it either fosters development or
damages it."' 87 When the juveniles are released from detention, they may react
negatively to law enforcement if their experiences while in detention were
unfavorable. An FBI agent noted that "'[t]hese are the kids who someday will kill
a cop for giving them a traffic ticket just because of attitudes developed toward
184 Implementation of Prisoners Rights Legislation, supra note 162.
185 Transcript of Oral Argument at *38, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (No. 94-
1511), available in 1995 WL 712349.
186 Juvenile Confinement Institutions and Correctional Systems, Hearings on S. Res. 32
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 92nd Cong. 596 (1971) (statement
of Charles Scott, Counselor, Maryland Training School for Boys, Baltimore, Md., and former
prison inmate).
87 Christy, supra note 104, at 108, 111.
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authority while in [a juvenile facility]."' 188  Attorney assistance in resolving
conditions is, therefore, not only in the best interest of the incarcerated juvenile, but
also in society's best interest.
IV. THE POST-CASEY PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF JOHN L.
Despite the apparent detrimental impact of Casey on the John L. decision, it is
possible to postulate several arguments as to why John L. should remain good law.
The Court in Casey left the door slightly open for juveniles: first, Casey was a
plurality opinion lacking a strong concurrence; second, juveniles may deserve
additional protection as a special class of inmates; and third, the lack of legal
representation for juveniles may itself meet the Casey "actual injury" requirement.
A. The Casey Decision Does Not Give Clear Direction
The Court's decision in Casey was not as definitive as the eight-to-one vote
would make it appear. Three justices, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, joined in the
Caseyjudgment but dissented in Part II of the opinion.'89 Justice Stevens dissented
in the entirety. 90
System-wide relief was not appropriate in Casey because there were only isolated
incidents of constitutional violations among the few illiterate and segregated
prisoners. Justice Souter stated that this type of relief did not apply in Casey because
of "the respondents' failure to prove that denials of access to illiterate prisoners
pervaded the State's prison system."'' The majority, in Part II of the Casey opinion,
188 WOODEN, supra note 106, at 21 (quoting Agent Bob Nixon). In fact, some studies
indicate that a large percentage of adult inmates were juvenile offenders. Charles Manson,
right before being convicted of murder, provided the following chilling testimony:
I haven't decided yet what I am or who I am. I was given a name and a number
and I was put in a cell and I have lived in a cell with a name and a number ....
I never went to school, so I never growed up in the respect to learn, to read and
write too good. So I stayed in that jail and I have stayed stupid, and I have stayed
a child while I have watched your world grow up .... I have done my best to get
along in your world and now you want to kill me .... Ha! I'm already dead,
have been dead all my life. I've lived in your tomb that you built. I did seven
years for a $37.50 check. I did 12 years because I didn't have any parents ....
When you were out riding your bicycle, I was sitting in your cell looking out the
window and looking at pictures in magazines and wishing I could go to high
school and go to the proms, wishing I could go to the things you could do, but
oh so glad, oh so glad, brothers and sisters, that I am what I am.
Id. at 57.
.89 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 393 (1996).
190 See id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'' ld. at 397 (Souter, J., concurring).
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stated that "the court's failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of
actual injury renders its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid."' 9 2 However,
in a juvenile detention center, system-wide relief would be appropriate because the
entire inmate population is a special class in need of access to counsel.'93
The Supreme Court, in discussing the juvenile's right to counsel in initial
proceedings, has indicated that it may be amenable to such arguments. On numerous
occasions since the Gault decision, the Court has articulated the importance of an
attorney's role in juvenile proceedings. In Fare v. Michael C., 94 the Court stated that
"the lawyer is the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the
legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police and the courts."' 95
B. Juveniles as a Special Class of Inmates
Juveniles are a distinct class of inmates requiring affirmative assistance. Casey
recognized that some individuals must be provided legal assistance, but stated that
providing illiterate and non-English speaking inmates with adequate legal assistance
did not.mandate a system-wide remedy.'96
In determining whether juveniles should be classified as a group in need of
special treatment, courts should look to the characteristics of the inmate population
at issue. An amicus brief filed for the petitioners in Casey stated that, "[t]he right of
access to the courts requires corrections officials to afford inmates a meaningful
opportunity to present constitutional claims in a judicial forum. That principle
requires officials to consider the general character and circumstances of various
inmate populations."'97 The brief discussed an earlier Supreme Court decision,
Morrissey v. Brewer,98 in which the Court stated that "due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."' 99
Procedures must be based on "the capacities and circumstances of those who are
to be heard. 200 One can present a strong argument that juveniles do not have the
capability of bringing a challenge.20 ' Bounds, however, guarantees
192 Id. at 349.
'9' See infra text accompanying notes 196-221.
194 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
191 Id. at 719.
196 See Casey, 518 U.S. at 360.
' Amicus Brief at *8, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (No. 94-1511), available in
1995 WL 782808.
19' 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
199 Id. at 481.
200 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
201 See Younger v. Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D.Cal. 1970), in which the court stated:
A prisoner should know the rules concerning venue, jurisdiction, exhaustion of
remedies, and proper parties respondent. He should know which facts are legally
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the conferral of a capability-the capability of bringing contemplated
challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.
When any inmate, even an illiterate or non-English speaking inmate,
shows that an actionable claim of this nature which he desired to bring
has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is
currently being prevented, because this capability of filing suit has not
been provided, he demonstrates that the State has failed to furnish
"adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law. 202
In Casey, the Court did not discuss and, thus, did not overturn, this aspect of
Bounds. In a slightly different context, one commentator has noted that the
"'peculiar vulnerabilities"' ofjuveniles justify their claims to appointed counsel.2 °3
Building on Blackstone's words that the "'very disabilities [of minors] are
privileges,' 24 Catherine Ross, a visiting professor at Boston College Law School,
argues that the differences between the average child and average adult, although
traditionally used to minimize children's rights, mandate the appointment of counsel
for juveniles in civil litigation. 2" Ross notes the several areas of law already
requiring legal representation for juveniles including: the termination of parental
rights; abuse, neglect, or dependency proceedings; delinquency proceedings that may
result in incarceration; as well as custody proceedings and some civil litigation
brought under some states' statutes.20 Ross argues only for the extension of the right
significant, and merit presentation to the court, and which are irrelevant and
confusing....
"Access to the courts," then, is a larger concept than that put forward by the
State. It encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner might require to get
a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances
alleged by him.
Id. at 110. Without counsel, juveniles do not have access to the courts.
202 Casey, 518 U.S. at 356 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
828 (1977)).
203 See Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children
in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1571, 1571 (1996) (quoting 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 452 (1992)).
204 Id. (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 452
(1992)).
205 See id. at 1571-72.
206 See id at 1574-75; see also Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (1994) (mandating
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for judicial proceedings involving abuse and neglect);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39F (Law Co-op. 1994) (providing for children's right of
counsel in juvenile proceedings if child is "in need of services"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
458:17-a (1983) (providing for a guardian ad litem for children during divorce proceedings);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (West 1998) (requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem
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to counsel in civil litigation cases when a child is called before a court. °7 Many of
her arguments, however, could support the assertion that incarcerated juveniles
should have legal representation.2 '
Ross maintains that one of the main differences between juveniles and adults is
their ability to communicate.2' Effective communication is a learned skill-a skill
garnered through years of experience. In support of her argument, Ross quotes
Danish novelist Peter Hoeg:
Speaking is not easy. All your life you have listened, or looked as if
you were listening. The living word came down to you, it was not
something you, personally, gave voice to. You spoke only after having
put up your hand, and when you had been asked a question, and you said
what was certain and correct ....
The hurdles to communication by children on their own behalf are
ameliorated by the classic functions of the advocate's craft-listening,
eliciting information, tracking down facts, and using all of those tools to
advance a position.2" °
Ross also discusses the differences between children and adults in terms of
cognition, emotion, and judgment. t' Ross argues that: "vulnerability is a bundle of
presumed, perceived, or measurable ways in which children differ from adults in
dimensions such as factual understanding, inferential understanding (appreciation),
reasoning (both intellectual and moral), and ability to exercise choice, including
understanding the repercussions of choice." '212
Interestingly, Ross compares children to prisoners in arguing for the appointment
of counsel to children. 23 If, as Ross suggests, "[t]he view of children as prisoners
functions as a metaphor for powerlessness and lack of control, 21 4 then surely
incarcerated children are deserving of the utmost protection.
in actions involving the family); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (holding that juveniles
have a right to representation in judicial proceedings that may result in incarceration);
Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to Be Heard and Represented in Judicial
Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 255, 269-70, 270 n.58 (1991) (discussing some states'
requirements for appointing a guardian ad litem in custody cases).
207 See Ross, supra note 203, at 1575.
208 See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
209 See Ross, supra note 203 at 1578.
20 Id (quoting PETER HOEG, BORDERLINERS 218 (1994)).
21 See id. at 1588-89.
212 Id at 1590.
213 See id. at 1601.
214 Id. at 1607.
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The classic Venn diagram schematic illustrated below demonstrates the
reasoning behind this argument. Both prisoners and juveniles, represented by circles
"P" and "J," respectively, are in relatively powerless positions and deserve special
attention to ensure that their rights are protected. The incarcerated juveniles,
represented by the overlapping area ("JP") of the intersecting circles, are in an
especially vulnerable situation that mandates access to counsel.
One also can equate the juvenile class to a class of illiterate, or non-English
speaking, inmates in their right to legal assistance. In Casey, the Supreme Court
explicitly acknowledged the special protections that may be due to such inmates,
stating that "[a]s a result of the inability to receive adequate legal assistance,
prisoners who are slow readers have had their cases dismissed with prejudice. 215
Justice O'Connor noted that "there is some indication that a prisoner who cannot read
or who does not speak English might not have meaningful access to a library even
if it were there." '216 Justice Souter commented: "We're placing books in front of
someone who cannot read them, and we're placing legal helpers in front of someone
who cannot communicate with them. That seems utterly senseless. ' t 7
Along the lines of the court's reasoning in John L., one commentator noted:
"[A]ccess to the fullest law library anywhere is a useless and meaningless
gesture in terms of the great mass of prisoners.... To expect untrained
laymen to work with entirely unfamiliar books, whose content they cannot
understand, may be worthy of Lewis Carroll, but hardly satisfies the
substance of the constitutional duty." '18
215 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996) (quoting Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1553,
1558 (Ariz. 1992)).
216 Transcript of Oral Argument at *5, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (No. 94-
1511), available in 1995 WL 712349.
217 Id. at *6.
2 1 Nobel, supra note 171, at 1597 (quoting Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800, 803
(D.N.J. 1982)).
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The functional illiteracy of the incarcerated juvenile population makes a law library
ineffective in securing the juveniles' right of access to the courts. This argument is
vulnerable, however, because a large percentage of the adult inmate population is
illiterate. For example, in Casey, thirty-five percent of the inmate population in
question had a reading level of seventh grade or below, yet this was not enough to
justify system-wide relief.219 Illiteracy alone does not provide sufficient reason to
afford juveniles a service not granted to adult inmates.
Complicated procedures present another argument for providing legal counsel
to incarcerated juveniles. In order to bring a conditions of confinement challenge,
for example, ajuvenile first would have to exhaust all administrative remedies. Even
if ajuvenile cleared this hurdle, the timing and format requirements of lodging a legal
complaint against the corrections system is formidable. One judge explained his
criteria for reviewing inmate petitions:
[T]he first thing that makes a good case is good spelling, good typing,
good grammar. You don't see a lot of that in prisoner cases, but that's the
first thing that makes a good case.... Now, that's number one. Can I
read it? If I can read it, I take the time to read it. If it's illegible, I don't
take the time to translate it. I just can't. I don't have the time.22°
Even if the incarcerated juvenile is of an exceptionally high education level, he is
unlikely to have the experience or background necessary to properly present a claim
without assistance from counsel.221
Without legal assistance, juveniles are unlikely to have the ability to bring a
successful claim, whether, as noted in John L., this inability is due to their age or to
inexperience with the legal system. Following the logic set forth in John L., only a
lawyer can provide "meaningful access" tojuveniles. Valid claims will not be heard
unless attorney assistance is provided.
C. Actual Injury Requirement
The argument that the lack of legal representation for juveniles works an actual
injury is, in essence, the argument of this Note. Justice Scalia stated in Casey that
"[i]t is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions,
219 See Amicus Brief at *5 n.3, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (No. 94-1511),
available in 1995 WL 782808 (citing Pet. App. at 25a).
220 Nobel, supra note 171, at 1578 n.65 (citing JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE
PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER 146 (1988)).
22 See Ross, supra note 203, at 1599 ("[I]n most instances, minors lack the ability to
gather facts and deal with issues, handle their cases, [or] understand legal issues ... without
guidance from an attorney.").
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who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm." '222 Juveniles will
"imminently suffer" harm by not having legal counsel to assist in protecting their
rights. Although this argument failed for adults, juveniles are specially situated.
Courts should continue to recognize that "'evolving standards of decency' against
which courts evaluate the constitutionality of the conditions certainly provide greater
protection for juveniles than for adults. 223
V. CONCLUSION
The Casey decision represents a substantial step backwards in constitutional
prison litigation. In following public opinion, the Court has erected more barriers to
obtaining access to the judicial process. Judge Pregerson, the Ninth Circuit judge in
Lewis v. Casey, warned that "barrier by barrier, our constitutional jurisprudence will
be set back another 50 years. 224 Casey began to pull shut the "iron curtain" that
Wolffv. McDonnell stated did not exist "between the Constitution and the prisons of
this country." '225
Juveniles are in a precarious position-they are receiving more punitive
treatment and less rehabilitation, while the legislative and judiciary branches strip
their meaningful access to the courts and ability to challenge unconstitutional
conditions. The Casey decision apparently compounded this situation by
undermining the holding in John L. that failure to provide juveniles with the
assistance of legal counsel violates their constitutional right of access to the courts.
Certain characteristics of the incarcerated juvenile population, however, justify
continued special treatment as set forth in John L. It is in the best interests of these
juveniles, as well as the communities into which they will eventually be released, that
legal counsel be provided to assist them in asserting their rights while incarcerated.
Even if the trend toward more punitive treatment ofjuveniles continues, it should not
permit unconstitutional treatment.
AMYE. WEBBINK
2 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
223 Gary v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1437 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Santana v. Collazo,
714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
224 Hill, supra note 168, at 32 (citing Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1537 (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting)).
225 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
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